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Abstract
The rise of smartphones and web services made possible the large-scale collection of personal metadata. Information about
individuals’ location, phone call logs, or web-searches, is collected and used intensively by organizations and big data
researchers. Metadata has however yet to realize its full potential. Privacy and legal concerns, as well as the lack of technical
solutions for personal metadata management is preventing metadata from being shared and reconciled under the control
of the individual. This lack of access and control is furthermore fueling growing concerns, as it prevents individuals from
understanding and managing the risks associated with the collection and use of their data. Our contribution is two-fold: (1)
we describe openPDS, a personal metadata management framework that allows individuals to collect, store, and give fine-
grained access to their metadata to third parties. It has been implemented in two field studies; (2) we introduce and analyze
SafeAnswers, a new and practical way of protecting the privacy of metadata at an individual level. SafeAnswers turns a hard
anonymization problem into a more tractable security one. It allows services to ask questions whose answers are calculated
against the metadata instead of trying to anonymize individuals’ metadata. The dimensionality of the data shared with the
services is reduced from high-dimensional metadata to low-dimensional answers that are less likely to be re-identifiable and
to contain sensitive information. These answers can then be directly shared individually or in aggregate. openPDS and
SafeAnswers provide a new way of dynamically protecting personal metadata, thereby supporting the creation of smart
data-driven services and data science research.
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Introduction
Personal metadata – digital information about users’ location,
phone call logs, or web-searches – is undoubtedly the oil of
modern data-intensive science [1] and of the online economy [2].
This high-dimensional metadata is what allow apps to provide
smart services and personalized experiences. From Google’s
search to Netflix’s ‘‘movies you should really watch,’’ from
Pandora to Amazon, metadata is used by commercial algorithms
to help users become more connected, productive, and enter-
tained. In science, this high-dimensional metadata is already used
to quantify the impact of human mobility on malaria [3] or to
study the link between social isolation and economic development
[4].
Metadata has however yet to realize its full potential. This data
is currently collected and stored by hundreds of different services
and companies. Such fragmentation makes the metadata inacces-
sible to innovative services, researchers, and often even to the
individual who generated it in the first place. On the one hand, the
lack of access and control of individuals over their metadata is
fueling growing concerns. This makes it very hard, if not
impossible, for an individual to understand and manage the
associated risks. On the other hand, privacy and legal concerns are
preventing metadata from being reconciled and made broadly
accessible, mainly because of concerns over the risk of re-
identification [5–7].
Here we introduce openPDS, a field-tested personal data store
(PDS) allowing users to collect, store, and give fine-grained access
to their metadata to third parties. We also introduce SafeAnswers,
a new and practical way of protecting the privacy of metadata
through a question and answer system. Moving forward,
advancements in using and mining these metadata have to evolve
in parallel with considerations of control and privacy [8–11].
openPDS and SafeAnswers allow personal metadata to be safely
shared and reconciled under the control of the individual.
Towards Personal Data Stores
While questions of data ownership and the creation of
repositories of personal data have been discussed for a long time
[12–20], their deployment on a large-scale is a chicken-and-egg
problem; users are waiting for compatible services while services
are waiting for user adoption. Revelations of the collection and use
of metadata by governments and companies [21–22] have
however recently drawn attention to their potential. The
combination of 1) a public interest in questions of control but
also use of their data, 2) political and legal support on data
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ownership [23–26] and 3) the scale at which metadata can now be
collected and processed, might trigger the large-scale deployment
of PDS.
openPDS fully aligns with these trends. It uses the World
Economic Forum definition of ‘‘ownership’’ of metadata [25]: the
rights of possession, use, and disposal. It follows policies of the
National Strategy for Trust Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) [24]
and strongly aligns with the European Commission’s reform of the
data protection rules [23]. Finally, it recognizes that users are
interacting with numerous data sources on a daily basis.
Interoperability is thus not enough to achieve data ownership or
address privacy concerns. Instead, openPDS implements a secure
space acting as a centralized location where the user’s metadata
can live. openPDS can be installed on any server under the control
of the individual (personal server, virtual machine, etc) or can be
provided as a service (SaaS by independent software vendors or
application service providers). This allows users to view and reason
about their metadata and to manage fine-grained data access.
From an economic standpoint, data ownership by the individual
fundamentally changes the current eco-system. It enables a fair
and efficient market for metadata [2,27] – a market where users
can get the best services and algorithms for their metadata. Users
can decide whether a service provides enough value for the
amount of data it requests, and services can be rated and
evaluated. Users are empowered to ask questions like ‘‘Is finding
out the name of this song worth enough to me to give away my
location?’’ Users can seamlessly give new services access to their
past and present metadata while retaining ownership. From a
business standpoint, such data ownership is likely to help foster
alternatives to the current data-selling and advertising-based
business model. New business models focusing on providing
hardware for data collection, storage for metadata, or algorithms
for better using metadata might emerge while software for data
collection and data management might be mostly open-source.
The proposed framework removes barriers to entry for new
businesses, allowing the most innovative algorithmic companies to
provide better data-powered services [2].
Other approaches have been proposed for the storage, access
control, and privacy of data. Previous approaches fall into two
categories: cloud storage systems and personal data repositories.
First, cloud storage systems, such as the ones that have been
commercially developed by companies like Dropbox [28] and
Carbonite [29], are a first approximation of a user-controlled
information repository for personal data. They however focus on
storing files and only implement the most basic type of access
control, usually on a file or folder basis. They do not suggest any
data aggregation mechanisms and, once access has been granted,
the raw data is exposed to the outer world, potentially
compromising privacy. Second, personal data repositories have
been developed in academic [12–17,30,31] and commercial
settings [18–20]. All of these repositories are however restricted
to specific queries on a particular type of data, such as interests or
social security numbers. They provide only a basic access-control
level, which means that once access to the data is authorized,
privacy may be compromised. openPDS differs from previous
approaches in its alignment with current political and legal
thinking, its focus on large-scale metadata, and its SafeAnswers
privacy-preserving mechanism.
On Privacy
There is little doubt that web searches, GPS locations, and
phone call logs contain sensitive private information about an
individual. In 2012, 72 percent of Europeans were already
concerned about the use of their personal data [23]. The recent
revelations are unlikely to have helped [21,22]. Addressing users’
legitimate privacy concerns will soon be a prerequisite to any
metadata usage.
Protecting the privacy of metadata is known to be a hard
problem. The risks associated with high-dimensional metadata are
often subtle and hard to predict and anonymizing them is known
to be very hard. Over the last years, numerous works have exposed
the risks of re-identification or de-anonymization of apparently
anonymous datasets of metadata. An anonymous medical
database was combined with a voters’ list to extract the health
record of the governor of Massachusetts [7] while the Kinsey
Institute database was showed to be re-identifiable using demo-
graphics [32]. Twenty million web queries from around 650,000
AOL users were found to be potentially re-identifiable thanks to
people’s vanity searches [33] while the Netflix challenge dataset
was de-anonymized using users’ ratings on IMDB (The Internet
Movie Database) [6]. Finally, mobility datasets of millions of users
were found to be potentially re-identifiable using only four
approximate spatio-temporal points [5].
Geospatial metadata, the second most recorded information by
smartphone applications [34,35], is probably the best example of
the risks and rewards associated with metadata [36]. On the one
hand, a recent report of the Electronic Frontier Foundation [37]
worries about potentially sensitive information that can be derived
from geospatial metadata. For example, geo-spatial metadata
behavior collected from mobile phones has been shown to be very
useful in predicting users’ personalities [38]. On the other hand,
the number of users of location-aware services, such as Yelp or
Foursquare, are rising quickly as these services demonstrate their
benefits to users.
Numerous ways of anonymizing personal data beyond the
simple removal of explicit identifiers have been proposed. Similar
to the original k-anonymity model [39], they aim minimize
privacy risks while keeping data utility as high as possible. All
anonymization models have however several major limitations.
Generic anonymization models have been designed for
relatively low-resolution data and cannot be easily extended to
high-dimensional data such as GPS location or accelerometer
readings. Through generalization and suppression, k-anonymity
makes every record in a given table indistinguishable from at least
k{1 other records, thereby making it impossible to identify an
individual in that table. Variations and alternatives include ‘-
diversity [40], which address attacks based on lack of diversity in
the sensitive data and t-closeness [41,42] which aims at
maintaining the distribution of the sensitive data. The reader is
referred to the surveys [43,44] for further details. In metadata, any
information that is unique to an individual can be used to re-
identify him. Unicity (E) has been used to quantify the re-
identifiability of a dataset [5]. Most rich metadata datasets are
expected to have a high E. This means that, even if they are
computationally tractable, generic privacy models are likely to
result in most data having to be suppressed or generalized to the
top-most values in order to satisfy the privacy requirement [45].
This curse of dimensionality led to the development of models
dedicated to the anonymization of mobility data.
Mobility-focused anonymization models protect individual’s
mobility traces but only for very specific data applications or
against specific re-identification attacks. The anonymization
models in [46–50] protect the current location of the user,
allowing him to anonymously perform accurate location-based
searches. They however prevent any uses of historical metadata or
side information, making them impractical for research and smart
services using historical data. Other models [51,52] allow for the
anonymization of short successions of geospatial locations with no
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associated timestamps or [53] protect an individual’s mobility data
against re-identification at certain given times. These models
however focus on anonymizing mobility data with a certain
purpose or specific type of data in mind (i.e., current location,
trajectory without timestamps or mobility data in given times).
This makes these models impracticable for most data-science
applications in academia and organizations.
Finally, all anonymization models, generic or mobility-focused,
assume a setting in which the whole database is anonymized and
published once. This makes it impractical, as (1) the same database
is likely to be used to address different research questions (which
might need specific pieces of information) and (2) smartphone
applications or researchers might need access to the very latest
pieces of information. Modifying existing anonymization models
to support multiple releases has been shown to be non-trivial [54].
Indeed, anonymizing each publication on its own is not sufficient,
since a violation of privacy may emerge as a result of joining
information from different publications. Anonymizing the whole
database once and successively releasing the relevant part of the
anonymized data is not a solution either, since newer data may
become available. Several dedicated models were recently
suggested to address the multiple publications setting [54–57].
While very interesting, these models are based on extensions of the
original one publication models and are thus very limited in the
number and type of publications that they can handle.
SafeAnswers, a new paradigm
The goal of SafeAnswers is to turn an algorithmically hard
anonymization and application-specific problem into a more
tractable security one by answering questions instead of releasing
copies of anonymized metadata.
Under the openPDS/SafeAnswers mechanism, a piece of code
would be installed inside the user’s PDS. The installed code would
use the sensitive raw metadata (such as raw accelerometers
readings or GPS coordinates) to compute the relevant piece of
information within the safe environment of the PDS. In practice,
researchers and applications submit code (the question) to be run
against the metadata, and only the result (the answer) is sent back
to them. openPDS/SafeAnswers is similar to differential privacy
[58,59], both being online privacy-preserving systems. Differential
Privacy is however designed for a centralized setting where a
database contains metadata about numerous individuals and
answers are aggregate across these individuals. SafeAnswers is
unique, as it focuses on protecting the privacy of a single individual
whose data are stored in one place by reducing the dimensionality
of the metadata before it leaves the safe environment. This
individual-centric setting makes it practical for mobile applications
or data-science researchers. It however introduces new privacy
challenges [see Analysis].
Combined with openPDS, this simple idea allows individuals to
fully use their data without having to share the raw data.
SafeAnswers also allows users to safely grant and revoke data
access, to share data anonymously without needing a trusted third-
party, and to monitor and audit data uses [Fig. 1 and 2].
Results
The openPDS framework
The Dataflow. Looking at Fig. 3, consider a usecase in which
a user uses a personalized music service such as PersonalizedMu-
sic. Every time PersonalizedMusic needs to decide which song to
play next on the user’s mobile phone or desktop, it sends a request
to the user’s PDS. The actual computation of what song to play
next is done by the PersonalizedMusic SafeAnswers module (SA
module) inside the PDS front-end. As part of this processing, the
PersonalizedMusic SA module accesses the back-end database in
order to retrieve the required metadata. The PersonalizedMusic
SA module would only access the raw metadata that it was
authorized to when it was installed and all the processing would
take place in a software sandbox. Upon completing its processing,
the PersonalizedMusic SA module would return the name of the
next song to play back to the front-end who will validate it and
send it back to PersonalizedMusic.
The Database. Metadata are currently stored in a CouchDB
database. CouchDB is a NoSQL store that stores data as a key to
document mapping, where documents are JSON objects.
CouchDB also provides a large range of existing functionality
that lends itself well to the type of analysis needed to compute
answers or reduce the dimensionality of the metadata. It has built-
in support for MapReduce through CouchDB-Views, as well as
data validation. All SafeAnswers modules share one unified
database, and each SA module has a corresponding key prefix.
The Front-End. The front-end ensures that no unauthorized
operations are carried out on the underlying metadata. SA
modules are restricted to reading from the data sources they have
explicitly listed as dependencies. CouchDB can also enforce access
based on metadata types, time of access, time of collection, etc.
The access control mechanism is implemented based on Django
users and a permissioning system, where each app is registered as a
user. We are working to decouple the access control mechanism
and the PDS using oAuth1.0 protocol [60]. This will allow an
authentication server to hand out tokens associated with a specific
service and set of metadata. In addition, SA modules are executed
in a sandboxed environment, and all communications are
encrypted using 256 bits SSL connections. In some implementa-
tions, PDSs can be managed from a web interface.
SafeAnswers is one key innovation of the openPDS framework.
SafeAnswers allows for computations on user metadata to be
performed within the safe environment of the PDS. Only safe
answers, the exact information needed to provide the service, leave
the PDS. SA modules are intimately tied to the notion of Design
Documents in CouchDB. A CouchDB design document is
intended to be a document that describes an application to be
built on top of an underlying CouchDB instance. Each access of
the SA module to the database has to be authorized and each SA
module executes inside a sandbox. We are now working to add
additional fields to the CouchDB design document specification to
allow additional functionality, like SA module dependencies and
permissions. These descriptions will be written in the SA module
manifest to be programmatically enforced and to be presented to
the user before installation.
In large-scale deployments, we expect that, instead of develop-
ing a SA module from scratch for each app, there will be common
libraries that can be leveraged by SA modules or directly through
a standard API. For example, there could be a library that
supports functionality, like returning the current city a user is in
[15], his radius of gyration in the past 7 days [61] or whether he is
currently running. In the future, we also hope to further develop
the SafeAnswers system to support sessions. This would allow for
some of the most advanced data-science uses.
Field-studies and user feedback
Our two initial deployments offer a first qualitative evaluation of
the system. The first field study is monitoring the daily behavior of
individuals with diagnosed mental problems (PTSD, depression)
and controls subjects for a month through their smartphones [62].
Data is used to reproduce the diagnoses of mental health
conditions, focusing on changes in speech and social behavior.
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Recorded activities include psycho-motor activity, occupational
activity, social interaction, and sleep behavior.
Fig. 4 presents ‘‘focus-group’’ results about the reaction of
individuals to the openPDS framework (N~21, 6 females and 15
males, median age category is 29 to 34 old). We consider the
Figure 1. Mockups of the proposed SafeAnswers settings presented to the user for approval. This screen shows the question answered,
examples of the possible responses, and the sensors used to compute the response.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098790.g001
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deployment to be a success, as 81% of individuals say they would
use it in their personal life and, on a 1 to 5 scale (1: ‘‘Not at all
comfortable’’ and 5: ‘‘Extremely comfortable’’), are comfortable
with the data collection (mean: 4, sem: 0.27). From a privacy
perspective, we can see that the ability to delete data matters to
participants (mean: 4.10, sem: 0.27). We can qualitatively see that
users are generally comfortable sharing individual data with their
primary care provider and mental health specialist. However, they
seem to be less comfortable sharing such data with friends and
potentially their family members. We can also see that anonymity
matters to participants (mean:4 sem:0.30) and that they are
significantly more comfortable sharing anonymous, rather than
individual, data (p-value ,0.005 with a one-tailed, paired, non-
parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on 4 specific sharing
questions, and mean:4 sem:0.25 when asked on the importance
of anonymizing shared data). All these emphasize the relevance of
the openPDS/SafeAnswers framework.
A second study, the mobile territorial lab, in partnership with
Telecom Italia, Telefonica, and the Fondazione Bruno Kessler, is
now underway. It is composed of 70 young parents living in
Trento and its premises. The aim here is to create a long-term
living lab to study user behavior and to perform user studies.
Participants’ behavior is recorded using an extended version of the
open-sensing framework FunF [63]. All collected metadata are
stored on users’ PDSs.
Discussion
Performance
openPDS may introduce a performance overhead caused by its
distributed nature, the added security and privacy mechanisms
and the group computation mechanism [see Analysis].
First, the distributed nature of openPDS requires services to
access the user’s PDS when an answer has to be computed. In
cases where computing the answer is fast, the latency it imposes
might make an openPDS-based solution impracticable. Solutions
such as precomputing some values and locally caching them might
help. However, in cases where computing the answer inside the
PDS dominates the total execution time, this might not
significantly impact the user experience. In fact, this might
actually introduce a performance boost, since it parallelizes the
computations that are being performed at a per-PDS level.
Second, the added security and privacy mechanisms described
below may also result in performance overhead. This overhead
needs to be taken into account when choosing the appropriate
mechanism. For example, the on-the-fly nature of openPDS/
Figure 2. Mockups of the proposed interface showing the
number of requests sent by a given app per day.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098790.g002
Figure 3. openPDS system’s architecture. LBSinc web or mobile
app sent a request to the user’s openPDS. The request is passed on to
the LBSinc SA module, which requests access to the database in order
to retrieve the metadata needed to compute the answer. The SA
module computes the answer, which is then validated by the PDS
Front-End and send back to the web or the mobile app.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098790.g003
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SafeAnswers may lead to inference of sensitive data if the results of
several queries are joined together. On the one hand, using
techniques such as the one suggested by [54] may be very efficient
in preventing such inference, but they are relatively expensive in
computation time. On the other hand, adding noise to query
results may not be equally efficient, but would result in a much
faster computation time. Advanced techniques might thus be
crucial when dealing with credit card or location data, but noise
addition might be sufficient to protect less sensitive data such as
accelerometer readings.
For many years, group computation has been of theoretical
interest only. Great improvements and actual field-studies in
domains such as electronic voting, actioning, and data mining
have recently made group computation–also called Secure
Multiparty Computation, or SMC–of practical interest [64].
Similar to network latency, the overhead of SMC might become
reasonable if computing the answer dominates the total compu-
tation time. SMC has furthermore recently been generalized into
belief propagation algorithms [65]. This means that every node of
the computation does not have to communicate with every other
anymore, thereby reducing the overhead.
Usage Experience
In this section we describe two short scenarios for a user and a
developer switching to an openPDS/SafeAnswers system for
mobile applications.
End-User. Suppose Alice wants to install and use a
smartphone app like LBSinc, a location-based check-in applica-
tion, without using a PDS. Alice downloads the app onto her
phone, authorizes LBSinc to access her phone’s network
communication and GPS coordinates, and creates a user account
with LBSinc. The LBSinc app starts collecting metadata about her
and stores it all in its back-end servers. Under this model it is
difficult for Alice to access the metadata LBSinc uses to makes
inferences about her, or to remove the metadata she does not want
LBSinc to access or use.
Alternatively, Alice could decide to download a PDS-aware
version of LBSinc. She installs it just like she would install any
other smartphone app and authorizes it to access only her phone’s
network communication. When used for the first time, the
smartphone app prompts her to enter her PDS URI. Alice then
sees exactly what metadata the LBSinc SA module will have access
to and examples of the answers [see Fig. 2], the relevant
summarized information that will be send back to LBSinc. If she
accepts, the LBSinc SA module is installed onto her PDS and she
can start using it.
App Developer. Suppose a developer now wants to imple-
ment MyMusic, a smartphone app that plays music to Alice based
on her preferences and current activity. Under the current model,
he would first have to develop a smartphone app to collect the
metadata on Alice’s phone, record it, and periodically send it to a
server. He would then develop a server with an internal database
to store the raw activity data he collects, a secured API for this
database to receive the metadata, and a way to anonymize the
metadata or at least separate the user account information from
the metadata. He could then start developing an algorithm to
decide which song or type of music to play. The initial picture he
would have of users would be very rough, as he would have no
prior metadata to work with. Finally, he would have to wait to
collect a sufficient amount of metadata before being able to
provide adequate recommendations.
If operating within the openPDS/SafeAnswers framework, the
metadata that the developer needs are likely to have already been
collected either by a metadata collection app [66] or by another
application or service. The developer would then spend most of his
time writing an SA module that would decide which song or type
of music to play and test it on development copies of PDSs. The
PDS front-end would take care of creating the API and of securing
the connection for him. The developer’s algorithm would be able
to access a potentially large set of metadata, including historical
metadata.
Analysis
The openPDS framework suggests several mechanisms for
enhancing the privacy and security of personal metadata: Safe-
Answers, access control, sandboxes, and network encryption. In
Figure 4. Individuals’ reaction to data sharing. The error bars are bootstrapped 95% high-density intervals. We can qualitatively see that users
are generally comfortable sharing individual data with their primary care provider and mental health specialist. They however seem to be less
comfortable sharing such data with friends and potentially family members.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098790.g004
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this section, we discuss several cases where these might fall short
and discuss potential counter-measures.
Protecting aggregated answers of groups
A practical example would be a service, such as CouponInc,
which wants to execute a simple query to know how many of its
users are around a certain shop to send them a special coupon.
CouponInc might want to issue a query like ‘‘How many users are
in this geographical area at the current time?’’ or ‘‘How active are
these users during lunch time?’’
In a distributed setting, such computation falls under the well-
studied field of secure multi-party computation (SMC) [67], where
the querying agent never sees any individual user’s metadata but
can access information aggregated across users. User privacy is
preserved, as each PDS only sends cryptographically masked
messages to other nodes in the network.
Such a cryptographic technique fits elegantly into the PDS
model of computation [Fig. 5]. Rather than anonymizing and
computing over-complex data items, like GPS coordinates, the SA
modules could compute features locally to each user’s PDS,
reducing the dimensionality of the metadata. After the local
computation is done, the inferred facts–e.g. whether or not a given
user is in a given geographical area–can be aggregated in a
privacy-preserving way. This means that even the low-dimension
answer cannot be associated with a particular user.
Attacks in the case of well-behaved apps
Even in the absence of attackers, apps that behave as they are
supposed to might pose a risk to users’ privacy. We notice two
major challenges: (1) How can an openPDS/SafeAnswers
determine the required level of aggregation given that it only
has access to the metadata of a single user? (2) Well-behaved apps
could inadvertently collect data whose combinations may allow
others to infer sensitive information.
A potential solution to the first challenge might be found in [5].
The authors studied fifteen months of human mobility data for one
and a half million individuals, and found that one formula
determines the uniqueness of an individual’s mobility traces, given
the traces’ resolution (i.e., level of aggregation) and the amount of
background knowledge available to the adversary. If extended to
other types of data, such an equation could be used by
SafeAnswers to determine the required level of aggregation
needed when answering a query.
The fields of Privacy Preserving Data Publishing and Mining
aim to address a problem similar to the second challenge: how to
anonymize the current publication of a database so that the
combination of all past and current anonymized publications
respect privacy. These works suggest several interesting assump-
tions and techniques that could be adopted by the openPDS/
SafeAnswers framework. For example, the authors of [54] show
that the problem of accurately calculating the level of privacy
imposed by a set of three or more publications is NP-hard. The
authors then suggest a relaxed method for calculating the privacy
level in polynomial time. Their method is based on joining the set
of publications into a single table, which can then be checked
against some privacy requirement. They also suggest a supple-
menting algorithm for anonymizing the current publication so that
the required privacy level is obtained. Their methods might be
used by SafeAnswers in order to determine whether the current set
of queries and potential future queries might compromise privacy.
Work in statistical databases might also help address the second
challenge [68]. A statistical database aims to allow the execution of
statistical queries without compromising the confidentiality of any
individual represented in the database. Two approaches used in
this field could be useful for SafeAnswers: (1) A query restriction
rejects each query that could compromise a user’s privacy and
provides accurate answers to legitimate queries. The computation
of what is a legitimate query is usually based on the size of the
query’s results or the extent of overlap between queries. Note
however that the denial of a query may, in itself, provide
information to an an attacker. (2) Perturbation gives approximate
answers by adding noise to the answers computed from the
original metadata. Regardless of the specific perturbation tech-
nique, the designer must attempt to produce statistics that
accurately reflect the underlying database. Such perturbed
answers might however not be acceptable for all uses.
Attacks in the case of malicious apps
While well-behaved apps might inadvertently collect sensitive
information, apps that are voluntarily not playing by the rules pose
a serious threat to user’s privacy. The major risk we see here is
how to protect the metadata against an app that deliberately tries
to infer sensitive information by over-querying a user’s openPDS
or by colluding with other apps.
Technically, numerous techniques from anomaly detection may
help SafeAnswers detect suspicious behavior. For example, a
service that suddenly changes its query pattern; querying for
location every minute while it used to ask user’s location and speed
a few times in a row 3 times a day. The detection of anomalies,
outliers, or rare events, has recently gained a lot of attention in
Figure 5. Group Computation Overview. (1) A querying agent (like
CouponInc) passes a function that its wants a collaborative answer for,
along with a list of URI to PDSs. (2) PDSs all trade messages in order to
compute a collaborative answer. (3) The answer is reported back to the
querying agent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098790.g005
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many security domains, ranging from video surveillance and
security systems to intrusion detection and fraudulent transactions.
Accordingly [69], most anomaly detection methods are based on
the following techniques: classification, nearest neighbor, cluster-
ing, statistical, information theoretic, and spectral. Any of these
techniques, or their combination, can potentially be used by
SafeAnswers.
Anomaly detection could also be combined with reputation
systems to allow for a group of openPDSs to exchange information
about modules and services in real-time. The P2P reputation
systems literature considers different types of malicious behavior
that can be blocked with the help of reputation systems. These give
us a foretaste of potential risks. ‘‘Traitors’’ are services who initially
behave properly but then start to misbehave and inflict damage on
the community. This technique is particularly effective when the
service has become respectable and well installed. ‘‘Whitewashers’’
are services who leave and rejoin the system with new identities in
order to purge the bad reputations they acquired under their
previous identities. Finally, ‘‘Collusions’’ are a group of malicious
services acting together to cause damage. Such reputation systems
could be combined with other privacy mechanisms discussed here.
For example, an openPDS might decide to allow a service with a
medium rating to execute restricted or noisy queries but
temporarily block a service whose rating suddenly dropped.
Various UI mechanisms can also be used to warn users of
potentially malicious apps before they are installed. For example,
trust could be used to rate service providers. Adapting the
definition from [70], trust would reflects a user’s or a PDS’s
subjective view of a service, while reputation could be considered a
collective measure of trust reflecting a group view of that service.
Work by [71] shows that the reputation of the service provider
matters more than the specific data being accessed and hints at the
potential usefulness of a reputation system to help users decide
which services to trust. Various principles for computing
reputation and trust can be found in [72]. Besides a simple
summation or average of ratings, the authors mention discrete
models in which trust is a discrete value from a predefined set of
values, fuzzy models, bayesian systems, belief models, and flow
models.
Attacks compromising the host
Finally, openPDS is vulnerable to the traditional security and
privacy issues of any hosted system. Attackers could compromise
the authentication/control mechanisms or impersonate existing
users to gain access to the database or to corrupt the system. For
instance, in the case of virtual machines hosting openPDSs, an
attacker’s virtual machine can legitimately be located in the same
physical machine as openPDSs virtual machines. This is, however,
not specific to openPDS, and similar issues exist with any hosted
systems, such as SaaS, virtual machine and traditional servers.
Solutions include hypervisors [73] or data-at-rest encryption
[74,75] such as homomorphic encryption schemes [76]. The
main difference openPDS introduces is having the data distributed
across machines, systems, and implementations of openPDS.
While a full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, one might
imagine that a distributed and heterogeneous system might be
harder to attack than some of the traditional centralized ones
especially if information is shared across machines [see previous
section].
Conclusion
Finally, as technologists and scientists, we are convinced that
there is an amazing potential in personal metadata, but also that
benefits should be balanced with risks. By reducing the dimen-
sionality of the metadata on-the-fly and actively protecting users,
openPDS/SafeAnswers opens up a new way for individuals to
regain control over their privacy.
openPDS/SafeAnswers however still face a number of chal-
lenges. Each challenges includes several potential directions for
future research: (1) the automatic or semi-automatic validation of
the processing done by a PDS module; (2) the development of
SafeAnswers privacy-preserving techniques at an individual level
for high-dimensional and ever-evolving data (mobility data,
accelerometer readings, etc.) based on existing anomaly detection
framework and potentially stored in highly-decentralized systems;
(3) the development or adaptation of privacy preserving data-
mining algorithms to an ecosystem consisting of distributed PDSs;
and (4) UIs allowing the user to better understand the risks
associated with large-scale metadata and to monitor and visualize
the metadata used by applications.
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